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A Leaky Landfill

Map - Part 1
Map - Part 2

In 1989, Australian government authorities decided to use Homebush Bay as the site for a future Olympic Games. Even the chance of winning an Olympic bid, however, could not justify spending the $190 million that experts estimated it would cost to contain and treat the toxic wastes buried there. The government therefore sought a cheaper, more modest remediation strategy that could be carried out in time for the 1993 Olympic bid (Whithers 1996, p. 135).

Authorities considered various options for dealing with the wastes. One possibility was to segregate and treat the wastes, but this would have been difficult and expensive.

Another possibility would have been to take a "bank vault" approach–sealing up and walling in the wastes. This approach would have entailed tightly containing the contaminated soil with double liners beneath, soil capping over the top, leachate drains, and gas collection and treatment systems. This approach was tried for a badly contaminated embankment where the Olympic swimming facility was to be built, but the planners decided that it was too expensive to be used elsewhere (Whithers 1996, pp. 135-9).

A third, cheaper option was chosen for the rest of the site. It eliminated the gas collection and treatment systems and the double liners. This option meant that the wastes would continue to leak into underlying groundwater. A consultant to the government explained the reasoning behind this approach:

The liability associated with deterioration and or failure of a "bank vault" secure landfill remained constant with time, but its probability of occurrence increased with time as the facility aged. By contrast the leaky landfill would over time carry less liability as the quality of leachate eventually improved. Therefore it is an intrinsically more robust or resilient way of limiting risks.(Whithers 1996, p. 139)

In other words, the waste would be disposed of by letting it slowly leak into the surrounding environment, rather than by alternative means that carried the risk of a financial liability that might be incurred by a possible sudden and more traceable major failure in the future.

In public discussions, however, these cost and liability issues were not raised. Instead, the public was told that the leaky landfill was the only feasible option, given the difficulty of treating the diverse range of chemicals that were present on the site. The option of a more secure "bank vault" landfill was not discussed outside of consultants’ reports.

By choosing the leaky landfill option, the planners were able to reduce the cost of remediation of the Olympic site from $190 million to $69 million, including landscaping and road base preparations. This enabled most of the remediation to be completed by 1993, in time for Sydney to win the bid for the 2000 Olympic Games.

Australian guidelines are quite explicit about the public’s right to know and participate in decision-making about the clean-up of contaminated sites (ANZEC 1992, pp. 7, 9). The remediation work at Homebush Bay, however, was carried out without proper public consultation. The government’s reports on contamination at the site and the risks associated with it have not been published. In their place are newsletters and brochures produced for public relations purposes.

In 1992, when the remediation was already underway, a local environmental group conducted a survey which found that seventy-one per cent of the respondents felt that they were not getting enough information to form an opinion about what was being done in the Homebush Bay area. Roughly the same number–seventy-five per cent–-said they had not received enough information to satisfy them that the area would be safe for people to live and work.

The usual process in NSW for involving the public in such decisions is through the public and advertised display of an environmental impact statement (EIS), after which the public is able to make submissions. The mandatory requirement for such an EIS to be prepared was removed through the introduction of a new Regional Environmental Plan prepared by the NSW Department of Planning (1991). It gave the NSW Minister for Planning full authority to give consent for development of the area earmarked for Olympic facilities and allowed development of the contaminated land within the area–including landfilling, removal and reworking of filled material–to occur without the normal consultation process. The assistant director of planning at the NSW Department of Planning said the former plan was "too restrictive" because it caused delays in construction and prevented earthmoving on site because of fears of contamination. This would have hindered the construction of Olympic facilities.(North and Cook 1993)

The new Regional Environmental Plan angered some environmentalists. According to Jeff Angel (1993), director of the Total Environment Centre, the plan allowed the government to be "a law unto itself. It is incredible that despite the concerns previously expressed by environmentalists that Sydney’s Green Olympic bid was all hot air, the government still felt it necessary to issue the REP in this form."

On the day the bid was announced, the Regional Environment Plan came into effect, giving the minister powers to approve any development at Homebush Bay whether or not it was environmentally damaging. The head of Greenpeace at the time, Lynette Thorstensen, told the Herald that this was not a setback: "At this stage we are much more interested in seeing the green development up and running than having ourselves locked up in disputes about process." (Quoted in Southam 1993)

The urgency to get the Games ready without bothering about due process is something that the Olympic authorities undoubtedly appreciated. Public relations is a much simpler and more controllable process than genuine public consultation.

In the absence of true public participation, PR around the Homebush Bay site focused on vacuous media stunts and photo opportunities. A brochure by the Olympic Coordination Authority falsely described the remediation of the site as "world’s best practice."

On 31 October 1998 the OCA also organized an "Olympic Neighbors Day." Titled "The Big Clean-up," the event took area residents on a tour of the nicely landscaped Olympic site, while avoiding mention of the toxic wastes buried underneath the new lawns and shrubbery that will be slowly contaminating these neighbours’ groundwater for years to come.

The "remediation" at the Olympic site is already being used as a model for other contaminated sites. The greenwashing in this case suits not only the Olympic organizers, but also manufacturers that generate toxic wastes, those that bury them, and developers that seek to profit from the land on which these toxic wastes have been buried.

The landfills are not the only waste problem associated with the Olympic site. In 1997 Luscombe made a submission to the government on its plans to expand the Lidcombe Liquid Waste Plant (LWP). The plant is located between the Olympic sporting facilities and the athletesÕ village. Luscombe argued that the plant "should be phased out as a matter of priority". Amongst the concerns he raised in his submission were the "health and safety issues associated with the close proximity (240 metres) of the LWP to existing or proposed residential areas (eg. Newington/Olympic village)" and its "potential to contribute significant adverse effects on the area during major public events such as the Olympics". He also noted the "complaints from nearby residents regarding noxious odours and VOC [volatile organochlorine] emissions from the LWP". He claimed that "a facility that emits toxic, carcinogenic, persistent and bioaccumulative compounds to the environment, particularly within 250 metres of residential housing, clearly contradicts all of the principles of sound urban planning and environmental responsibility."

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References:

Angel, Jeff, (1993) 'Sydney's Olympic bid fails key environmental test', Media Release, 17 June.

ANZEC, (1992) Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for the Assessment and Management of Contaminated Sites, Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, National Health and Medical Research Council, January, pp. 7, 9.

Department of Planning (1991), Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 - Homebush Bay Development Area (Amendment No. 1), 24 May.

Greens In Lowe, (1992) 'Survey - Homebush Bay Development'.

North, Sam and Danielle Cook, (1993) ''Immediate' benefits if Games come', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 June.

Southam, Kate, (1993) 'Homebush planning has greens concerned', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October.

Whithers, N. J. (1996) 'Embracing Risk Management: The Homebush-Newington Experience' in Olympic Co-ordination Authority, Homebush Bay Ecological Studies 1993-1995, Volume 2, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, Vic, p. 135.

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© 2003 Sharon Beder