A second EPA risk assessment was done in 1988 which suggested that dioxin could be less potent than its 1985 assessment indicated. In the 1985 assessment, it had assumed that dioxin was a complete carcinogen which both initiated genetic change in cells and promoted the proliferation of damaged cells causing cancer. Industry scientists argued that dioxin was only a promoter of cancer and not a complete carcinogen. Among those putting this argument were Syntex scientists. Syntex Agribusiness was responsible for cleaning up a dioxin contaminated town—Times Beach, Missouri—and estimated that "relaxing the cleanup standard from one part per billion (ppb) to ten ppb would reduce cleanup costs by 65 percent." (Commoner 1988, p. 30)

Animal studies seemed to indicate that dioxin was a complete carcinogen but it did not behave like either an initiator nor a promoter. Rather than question the initiator-promoter model, which has since been found to be inappropriate to dioxin, the EPA decided to base its risk assessment on a mid-point between the risk of a promoter and that of a complete carcinogen. This would have resulted in the 'safe' standard being loosened by 16 times (Commoner 1988, pp. 30-1).

However this move was thwarted when evidence of the manipulation of the industry studies was presented to the EPA's Scientific Assessment Board by an EPA project manager and chemist, Cate Jenkins. The Board subsequently argued that there was no scientific justification for changing the dioxin standards (Roberts 1991). In the meantime the allegation that the industry studies had been fraudulent was investigated by the EPA's Office of Criminal Investigations which concluded that this was "immaterial to the regulatory process" and "beyond the statute of limitation." (Gibbs & CCHW 1995, p. 7)

According to an EPA policy analyst, William Sanjour:

One gets the impression, on reviewing the record, that as soon as the criminal investigation began, a whole bunch of wet blankets were thrown over it. ... None of the scientific groups in the EPA, it seems, wanted to touch this hot potato, and no one in position of authority was instructing them to do so. (Quoted in Gibbs & CCHW 1995, p. 7)

Instead Cate Jenkins, whose memo prompted the investigation, was herself investigated for two years. She was transferred to "an unimportant position with nothing to do" and spent a few years fighting her employer, the EPA, in the courts before she was vindicated and reinstated (Gibbs & CCHW 1995, p. 7).

When the EPA failed to adjust their standards for dioxin following the 1988 reassessment, the various interests concerned continued to apply pressure to downgrade the standards and to convince the public that dioxin wasn't really dangerous. A loosening of dioxin standards could mean that pulp and paper mills would not have to install expensive new equipment to reduce or eliminate dioxin being discharged into waterways.

A reappraisal of how dangerous dioxin was could also save dioxin producers billions of dollars in legal claims from those exposed to it. In October 1990 the paper making company Georgia Pacific had lost a court case in Mississippi for alleged dioxin pollution and had $1 million in punitive damages awarded against it. This was expected to trigger many other similar suits against other paper mills in various states, involving thousands of people and worth billions of dollars (Montague 1991). Other industries were facing similar legal actions.

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Additional Material

Commoner, Barry, 1988, 'Acceptable Risks: Who Decides?', Harper's Magazine, Vol. 276, No. 1656, pp. 28-32.

Gibbs, Lois Marie and The Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, 1995, Dying from Dioxin (Boston, MA: South End Press).

Montague, Peter, 1991, A Tale of Science and Industry, Rachel's Hazardous Waste News, No. 248.

Roberts, Leslie, 1991, 'Dioxin Risks Revisited', Science, Vol. 251 (8 February), pp. 624-6.

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